

## **FEDERALISMO COMPARADO: TEORIAS E EXPLICAÇÕES**

**Responsável: Profa. Dra. Marta Arretche**

### **I. Objetivo**

O objetivo do curso é apresentar e discutir a controvérsia entre correntes da Ciência Política contemporânea acerca dos efeitos de modalidades de democracia consociativa sobre a produção de políticas públicas e a desigualdade. Com esse objetivo, o curso se concentrará na discussão das principais teorias e conceitos da análise comparada do federalismo.

### **II. Justificativa**

A análise comparada do federalismo tornou-se um dos pontos centrais da agenda de estudos da ciência política brasileira e internacional. O curso se justifica pela necessidade de formar teoria e conceitualmente alunos de pós-graduação para desenvolver estudos comparados sobre o tema.

### **III. Forma**

O curso será desenvolvido com base em aulas expositivas, seminários e na participação dos alunos.

### **IV. Conteúdo**

#### **1. Acerca da distinção entre federalismo e descentralização:**

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- Blume, Lorenz and Voigt, Stefan (2011). "Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators", *Constitutional Political Economy*, September, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 238-264
- Voigt, Stefan and Lorenz Blume (2012). "The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment," *Public Choice*, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 229-254, April.

- Leituras complementares:

- Braun, Dietmar (2000). "The Territorial Division of Power in Comparative Public Policy Research: An Assessment", in: Braun, Dietmar. (2000). *Public Policy and Federalism*. Ashgate.
- Lipjhart, Arend (1999). *Modelos de Democracia*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. Capítulo 1.
- Obinger, Herbert; Stephan Leibfried and Francis Castles (ed.) (2005). *Federalism and the Welfare State. New World and European Experiences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Xu, Chenggang (2011). "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(4): 1076-1151.

## **2. Federalismo e Processo decisório:**

### **2.1. A tese dos pontos de veto:**

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- Huber, Evelyne; Ragin, Charles; John Stephens (1993). "Social Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State" *American Journal of Sociology*. 99(3): 711-49.
- Tsebelis, George (1997). "Processo decisório em sistemas políticos: veto players no presidencialismo, parlamentarismo, multicameralismo e multipartidarismo". *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 12 (34): 89-118.
- Riker, William (1982). *Liberalism Against Populism*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

- Leituras complementares:

- Pierson, Paul (1995). "Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policies". *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, vol. 8, nº 4, pp. 449-478.
- Ross, Fiona (1997). "Cutting Public Expenditures in Advanced Industrial Democracies: the importance of blame avoidance", *Governance*, 10(2): 175-200.
- Scharpf, Fritz (1988). "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration". *Public Administration*, vol. 66, pp. 239-278.

- Francis G. Castles (1998). *Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation*. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elga.

## 2.2. A tese da competição entre as jurisdições:

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- Buchanan, James. (1995). "Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Winter, pp. 19-28.
- Rodden, Jonathan and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1997). "Does Federalism Preserve Markets?", *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 83, No. 7: pp. 1521-1572.
- Tiebout, Charles (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*, No. 64: pp. 416-424
- Weingast, Barry (1995). "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development", in: *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (April), pp. 1-31

- Leituras Complementares:

- Inman, Robert P. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997). "The Political Economy of Federalism", in: Mueller, D. (ed.) (1997). *Perspectives on Public Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peterson, Paul and Mark C. Rom (1990). *Welfare Magnets: a new case for a national standard*. Washington: The Brookings Institutions
- Prud homme, Remy. (1995). "The dangers of decentralization." *The World Bank Research Observer* 10 (2): 201-220.
- Wildavsky, Aaron (1984). "Federalism means inequality: Geometry, Political Sociology, and Political Culture", in: Golembiewski, Robert T. and Aaron Wildavsky (ed.) (1984). *The Costs of Federalism*. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Books. p. 55-69. Wildavski (1984)
- Zodrow, George R, ed. (1983). *Local Provisions of Public Service: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years*. New York and London: Academic Press, 1983.

### 2.3. A tese do "overgrazing"

- Rodden, Jonathan (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World", *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3): 670-87.
- Wibbels, Erik (2000). "Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance", *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 687-702.

### 3. Razões da centralização:

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- Banting, Keith (2006). Social Citizenship and Federalism: Is a Federal State a contradiction in terms?", in: Greer, Scott (ed.) (2006). *Territory, Democracy, and Justice. Regionalism and Federalism in Western Democracies*. London: Pallgrave Macmillan. P. 44-66.
- Bednar, Jenna; Eskridge Jr., William N.; Ferejohn, John (1999). "A Political Theory of Federalism", in Ferejohn, John; Ravoke, Jack N.; Riley, Jonathan. (1999). *Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 223-69.
- Beramendi, Pablo (2007) Inequality and the Territorial Fragmentation of Solidarity, in: *International Organization* (61): 783-820
- Chibber, P. K. and Ken Kollman (2004). *The formation of national party systems*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Panizza, Ugo (1999). "On the Determinants of Fiscal Centralization: Theory and Evidence," *Journal of Public Economics*, 74: 97-139.

- Leituras Complementares:

- Alesina, Alberto and Edward Glaeser (2005). *Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference*. Chapter 5
- Banting, Keith and Stan Corbett (2002). "Health Policy and Federalism: an introduction", in: Banting, Keith and Stan Corbett (ed.) (2002). *Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multi-level Governance*. Queen's University: Institute of Intergovernmental relations.
- Beramendi, Pablo and Thomas R. Cusack (2009) "The Politics and Economics of Wage, Market, and Disposable Income Inequalities", *Political Research Quarterly*, 62(2): 257-275.

- Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1996). "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58, 4: p. 1132-55.
- Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage (2008) "Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long run." Working paper, Yale and NYU.
- Levitt, Steven and James Snyder (1995). "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays", *American Journal of Political Science* 39, 4: 958-80.
- Lind, Jo Thori (2005). "Why is there so little redistribution?", *Nordic Journal of Political Economy* 31: 111-125.
- Lindert, Peter (2004). *Growing Public Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4, 7, 13.
- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan (2000). "Inequality Inducing and Inequality Reducing Federalism," paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 1-5, 2000, Quebec City, Canada.

#### **4. Interpretações sobre o Brasil:**

- Arretche, Marta (2012). *Democracia, Federalismo e centralização no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: FGV/Fiocruz.
- Arretche, Marta (2013) "Demos-Constraining or Demos-Enabling Federalism? Political Institutions and Policy Change in Brazil", in: *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 5 (2): 133-150.
- Arretche, Marta (2013). "Quando instituições federativas fortalecem o governo central?", *Novos Estudos CEBRAP*, 95: 38-57.
- Arretche, Marta e Jonathan Rodden (2004). "Política Distributiva na Federação: Estratégias Eleitorais, Barganhas Legislativas e Coalizões de Governo", *Dados*, 2004, 47 (4)
- Rodden, Jonathan (2006). *Hamilton's Paradox*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Samuels, David, and Scott Mainwaring (2004). "Strong Federalism, Constraints on the Central Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil". In Gibson, Edward L. (org.). *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*, 85-130.

- Samuels, David and Fernando Luiz Abrucio (2000). Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The "New" Politics of the Governors in Brazil, *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 30 (2): 43-61.
- Stepan, Alfred (2004). "A new comparative politics of federalism", in: Gibson, Edward L. (org.). *Federalism and democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore/Londres: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stepan, Alfred (2000). "Brazil's decentralized federalism: Bringing government closer to the citizens?", *Daedalus* 129 (2):145-169.

## **V. Avaliação**

A avaliação será baseada em nota composta por uma resenha para cada aula e um trabalho a ser apresentado ao final do curso.