

FEDERALISMO COMPARADO: TEORIAS E EXPLICAÇÕES

Responsável: Profa. Marta Arretche

I. Objetivo

O objetivo do curso é apresentar e discutir a controvérsia entre correntes da Ciência Política contemporânea acerca dos efeitos de modalidades de democracia consociativa sobre a produção de políticas públicas e a desigualdade. Com esse objetivo, o curso se concentrará na discussão das principais teorias e conceitos da análise comparada do federalismo.

II. Justificativa

A análise comparada do federalismo tornou-se um dos pontos centrais da agenda de estudos da ciência política brasileira e internacional. O curso se justifica pela necessidade de formar teoria e conceitualmente alunos de pós-graduação para desenvolver estudos comparados sobre o tema.

III. Forma

O curso será desenvolvido com base em aulas expositivas, seminários e na participação dos alunos.

IV. Conteúdo

1. A distinção entre federalismo e descentralização:

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- ✓ Lipjhart, Arend (1999). *Modelos de Democracia*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. Capítulos 2 e 3.

- ✓ Obinger, Herbert; Stephan Leibfried and Francis Castles. (ed.) (2005). *Federalism and the Welfare State. New World and European Experiences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Capítulo 1.

- Leituras complementares:

- ✓ Arretche, Marta (2009). "Continuidades e Descontinuidades da Federação Brasileira: de como 1988 facilitou 1995", *Dados*, 52(2): 377-423.

- ✓ Arretche, Marta (2010). "Federalism, bicameralism and institutional change: exploring correlations and mechanisms", in *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 4(2): 10-31.
- ✓ Bednar, J. "The Political Science of Federalism." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 7, no. 1 (2011): 269-288.
- ✓ Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Arjan Schakel (2010). *The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- ✓ Lorenz, Blume and Stefan Voigt (2011) Federalism and decentralization: a critical survey of frequently used indicators. *Constitutional Political Economy*
- ✓ Riker, William (1964), *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*.
- ✓ Rodden, Jonathan. 2004. "Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement" *Comparative Politics* 36. 4: 481-500.

2. Federalismo e Processo decisório:

2.1. Porque instituições federativas importam?

- Leituras Obrigatórias:

- ✓ Lipjhart, Arend (1999). *Modelos de Democracia*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. Capítulo 16
- ✓ Livingston, W S. "A Note on the Nature of Federalism." *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (1952): 81-95.

- Leituras complementares:

- ✓ Treisman, Daniel S. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- ✓ Gerring, John, and Strom C Thacker. *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- ✓ Gibson, Edward L. "Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries." *World Politics* 58 (2005): 101-132.

2.2. A tese dos pontos de veto:

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- Huber, Evelyne; Ragin, Charles and John Stephens (1993). "Social Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State" *American Journal of Sociology*. 99(3): 711-49.

- Stepan, Alfred. "Para uma nova análise comparativa do federalismo e da democracia: federações que restringem ou ampliam o poder da demos". *Dados*, vol. 42, nº 2, 1999, pp. 197-251.

- Leituras complementares:
 - ✓ Samuels, David, and Fernando Luiz Abrucio. 2000. Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The "New" Politics of the Governors in Brazil. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 30 (2): 43-61.
 - ✓ Stepan, Alfred. 2000. "Brazil's decentralized federalism: Bringing government closer to the citizens?" *Daedalus* 129 (2):145-169.
 - ✓ Arretche, Marta (2007). "The Veto Power of territorial governments in Brazil: political institutions and representatives voting behaviour", in: *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 2: 40-73.
 - ✓ Arretche, Marta (2013). "Quando instituições federativas fortalecem o governo central?", *Novos Estudos CEBRAP*, 95: 38-57.

- ✓ Castles, Francis G. *Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation*. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998.

- ✓ Pierson, Paul. (1995), "Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policies". *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, vol. 8, nº 4, pp. 449-478.

- ✓ Riker, William. *Liberalism Against Populism*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982.

- ✓ Ross, Fiona (1997). "Cutting Public Expenditures in Advanced Industrial Democracies: the importance of blame avoidance", *Governance*, 10(2): 175-200.

- ✓ Samuels, David, and Scott Mainwaring. 2004. Strong Federalism, Constraints on the Central Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil. In *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*, 85-130.

- ✓ Scharpf, Fritz. (1988), "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration". *Public Administration*, vol. 66, pp. 239-278.

- ✓ Stepan, "A new comparative politics of federalism". Gibson, Edward L. (org.). *Federalism and democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore/Londres: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

- ✓ Tsebelis, George (1997). "Processo decisório em sistemas políticos: veto players no presidencialismo, parlamentarismo, multicameralismo e multipartidarismo". *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 12 (34): 89-118.

2.3. A tese da competição entre as jurisdições:

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- ✓ Tiebout, Charles (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*, No. 64: pp. 416-424
- ✓ Buchanan, James M. (1995) "Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 19-28

- Leituras Complementares:

- ✓ Inman, Robert P. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997). "The Political Economy of Federalism", in: Mueller, D. (ed.) (1997). *Perspectives on Public Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ✓ Peterson, Paul and Mark C. Rom (1990). *Welfare Magnets: a new case for a national standard*. Washington: The Brookings Institutions
- ✓ Prud homme, Remy. (1995). "The dangers of decentralization." *The World Bank Research Observer* 10 (2): 201-220.
- ✓ Rodden, Jonathan and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1997) "Does Federalism Preserve Markets?," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 83, No. 7: pp. 1521-1572
- ✓ Weingast, Barry (1995). "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development", in: *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (April), pp. 1-31
- ✓ Wildavsky, Aaron (1984). "Federalism means inequality: Geometry, Political Sociology, and Political Culture", in: Golembiewski, Robert T. and Aaron Wildavsky (ed.) (1984). *The Costs of Federalism*. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Books. p. 55-69. Wildavski (1984)
- ✓ Zodrow, George R, ed. (1983). *Local Provisions of Public Service: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years*. New York and London: Academic Press.

2.3. A tese do "overgrazing"

- Leituras obrigatórias:

- ✓ Rodden, Jonathan (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World", *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3): 670-87.
- ✓ Wibbels, Erik (2000). "Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance, *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 687-702.

- Leitura complementar:
- ✓ Arretche, Marta (2010). "Federalismo e Igualdade Territorial: Uma Contradição em Termos?", *Dados*, 53 (3): 587-620.

3. Razões da des/centralização:

- Leituras obrigatórias:
 - ✓ Bednar, Jenna; Eskridge Jr., William N.; Ferejohn, John. (1999). "A Political Theory of Federalism", in Ferejohn, John; Rove, Jack N.; RILEY, Jonathan. (1999). *Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 223-69.
 - ✓ Beramendi, Pablo (2007) Inequality and the Territorial Fragmentation of Solidarity, in: *International Organization* (61): 783-820
- Leituras Complementares
 - ✓ Alesina, Alberto and Edward Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 - ✓ Arretche, Marta e Jonathan Rodden (2004). "Política Distributiva na Federação: Estratégias Eleitorais, Barganhas Legislativas e Coalizões de Governo", *Dados*, 2004, 47 (4)
 - ✓ Banting, Keith (2006). Social Citizenship and Federalism: Is a Federal State a contradiction in terms?", in: Greer, Scott (ed.) (2006). *Territory, Democracy, and Justice. Regionalism and Federalism in Western Democracies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 44-66.
 - ✓ Banting, Keith and Stan Corbett (2002). "Health Policy and Federalism: an introduction", in: Banting, Keith and Stan Corbett (ed.) (2002). *Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multi-level Governance*. Queen's University: Institute of Intergovernmental relations.
 - ✓ Beramendi, Pablo and Thomas R. Cusack. (2009) "The Politics and Economics of Wage, Market, and Disposable Income Inequalities. *Political Research Quarterly*, 62(2): 257-275.
 - ✓ Chibber, P. K., and Ken Kollman (2004). *The formation of national party systems*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
 - ✓ Levitt, Steven and James Snyder (1995). "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays." *American Journal of Political Science* 39, 4: 958-80.
 - ✓ Lind, Jo Thori (2005). "Why is there so little redistribution?" *Nordic Journal of Political Economy* 31: 111-125.

- ✓ Lindert, Peter (2004). *Growing Public Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4, 7, 13.
- ✓ Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan (2000). "Inequality Inducing and Inequality Reducing Federalism," paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 1-5, 2000, Quebec City, Canada.
 - Panizza, Ugo (1999). "On the Determinants of Fiscal Centralization: Theory and Evidence," *Journal of Public Economics* 74: 97-139.
- ✓ Rodden, Jonathan. *Hamilton's Paradox* (2006). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

V. Avaliação

A avaliação será baseada em nota composta por uma resenha para cada uma das unidades e um trabalho a ser apresentado ao final do curso.