

**Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas  
Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciência Política**

**FLS6359  
Instituições Políticas e Desigualdade: Teorias e Explicações  
2º semestre de 2024**

**Profa. Marta Arretche**

**I. Objetivo**

O objetivo do curso é apresentar e discutir as abordagens da ciência política contemporânea acerca das relações entre instituições políticas e produção/redução das desigualdades. Esta será abordada apenas do ponto de vista da desigualdade entre indivíduos.

**II. Justificativa da disciplina**

A desigualdade tornou-se um dos temas centrais da análise comparada das instituições políticas. O curso se justifica pela necessidade de formar teórica e conceitualmente alunos de pós-graduação para desenvolver estudos comparados sobre o tema.

**III. Metodologia**

O curso será desenvolvido de forma presencial. Para cada aula, há leituras indicadas, que deverão ser realizadas previamente. Para cada aula, os alunos enviarão uma resenha das leituras obrigatórias, a serem entregues até às 10h do dia da respectiva sessão.

**IV. Avaliação**

A avaliação será baseada em nota composta pelos exercícios entregues a cada aula e por um trabalho final.

## V. Programa

### • 12 de agosto: AULA 1: A redução da desigualdade via violência

Leitura obrigatória:

Scheidel, Walter (2017). *The Great Leveler*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Introdução. Pp. 1-23.

Leituras complementares:

Kuznets, Simon (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality. *The American Economic Review*, Volume 45, Issue 1, Mar, pp. 1-28.

Piketty, T. (2014). *O Capital no Século XXI*. São Paulo: Intrínseca. Capítulos Sete (Desigualdade e Concentração: primeiras impressões) e Oito (Os dois mundos). Pp. 233-295.

Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2014). Inequality in the long run. *Science*, 344 (6186), May, pp. 838-42.

Piketty, Thomas (2015). Putting Distribution Back at the Center of Economics: Reflections in the Twenty-First Century. *Journal of Economics Perspectives*, 29 (1); 67-88.

Alvaredo, Facundo; Atkinson, Anthony B.; Piketty, Thomas; Saez, Manuel (2013). The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective. *Journal of Economics Perspectives*, 27 (3): 3-20.

### • 19 de agosto: AULA 2: A teoria do eleitor mediano

Leituras obrigatórias:

Meltzer, A. H. and Richard, S. F (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, *Journal of Political Economy*, 89, pp. 914-27.

Lupu, Noam and Pontusson, Jonas (2011). The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution. *The American Political Science Review*, 105(2): 316-36.

Leituras complementares:

Downs, Anthony [1957](1999). *Uma Teoria Econômica da Democracia*. São Paulo: Edusp. Cap. 7

### • 26 de agosto: AULA 3: A dependência estrutural do estado em relação ao capital

Leitura obrigatória:

Przeworski, Adam. "A social-democracia como um fenômeno histórico". in: Przeworski, Adam. *Capitalismo e Social-democracia*. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 1989. Cap. 1.

Leituras complementares:

- Przeworski, Adam and Sprague, John (1986). *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Przeworski, Adam and Wallerstein, Michael (1988). Structural Dependence of the State on Capital. *The American Political Science Review*, 82 (1): 11-29.
- Adam Przeworski, Adam (2023). The future of social democracy. Ralph Miliband Memorial Lecture, delivered at the London School of Economics on June 7, 2023.

**\* 02 a 06 de setembro: SEMANA DA PÁTRIA – NÃO HAVERÁ AULA\***

**• 09 de setembro: AULA 4: Regimes de bem-estar social e a teoria das relações de poder**

Leitura obrigatória:

- Esping-Andersen, G. (1991). As três economias políticas do Welfare State. In: *Lua Nova*, No. 24.

Huber, Evelyne and Stephens, John D. (2013) *Democracy and the Left. Social policy and inequality in Latin America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Capítulo 2 (Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approach).

Huber, Evelyne; Machtei, Itay; Stephens, John D. (2023). Testing Theories of Redistribution: Structure of Inequality, Electoral Institutions, and Partisan Politics. *LIS Working Paper Series*, No. 854, February.

Leituras complementares:

Arretche, Marta T. S. (1995). "Emergência e desenvolvimento do Welfare State: teorias explicativas". In: *BIB: Boletim Bibliográfico de Ciências Sociais*, No. 39

Batista, Cristiane (2008). "Partidos Políticos, Ideologia e Política Social na América Latina: 1980-1999", *DADOS. Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 51 (3): 647-86.

Bradley, David; Huber, Evelyne; Moller, Staphanie; Nielsen, François; Stephens, John D. (2003). Distribution and Redistribution in Post-industrial Societies. *World Politics*, 55, pp. 193-228.

Castles, Francis (1986). Social Expenditure and the Political Right: a methodological note. *European Journal of Political Research*, 14: 669-76.

Castles, Francis G. and Obinger, Herbert (2007). *Journal of European Social Policy*, 17(3): 206-22.

Hibbs Jr., Douglas A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, *The American Political Science Review*, LXXI(4): 1467-1487, December.

Huber, Evelyne; Pribble, Henny; Nielsen, François, Stephens, John D. (2006). Politics and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, *American Sociological Review*, 71: 943-63.

Kingstone, Peter and Young, Joseph (2009). Partisanship and Policy Choice. What's Left for the Left in Latin America? *Political Research Quarterly*, 62 (1): 29-41.

- **16 de setembro: AULA 5: O Papel das Instituições**

Leituras obrigatórias:

- Acemoglu, D; Naidu, S.; Restrepo, P. and Robinson, J. (2015). "Democracy, Redistribution, and inequality", in: Atkinson, A. Bourguignon, F. (2015). *Handbook of Income Distribution*. Volume 2B. Oxford: North-Holland. Pp.1885-1960.
- Iversen, T. and Soskice, D (2006). Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: why some democracies redistribute more than others, *American Political Science Review*, 100(2): 165-181.

Leituras complementares:

- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A (2015). The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 29 (1): 3-28.
- Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. Acemoglu (2005). Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in: *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf. Elsevier. Chapter 6.

- **23 de setembro: AULA 6: Arenas de veto**

Leitura obrigatória:

- Immergut, Ellen M (1996). "As Regras do Jogo: A lógica da política de saúde na França, na Suíça e na Suécia", in: *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, (30) 11: 139-63.

Leituras complementares:

- Immergut, Ellen M. (1992). *Health Politics. Interests and Institutions in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, George, and Jeannette Money. 1997. *Bicameralism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 1997. Processo decisório em sistemas políticos: *Veto players* no presidencialismo, parlamentarismo, multicameralismo e multipartidarismo. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 12 (34): 89-118.

- **30 de setembro: AULA 7: Teorias da Captura do estado**

Leituras obrigatórias:

- Page, Benjamin and Gilens, Martin (2017). *Democracy in America? What has gone wrong and what we can do about it*. Cap 2 (Unequal Wealth Distorts Politics?) and Cap 3 (Thwarting the Will of the People). Pp.
- Achen, Christopher and Bartels, Larry (2016). Democracy for realists: why elections do not produce responsive government. Cap 1 (Democracy Ideas and Reality), Cap 2 (The Elusive Mandate: elections and the mirage of popular control), cap 3

(Tumbling down into a democratic republic: “pure democracy” and the pitfalls of popular control.

Leituras complementares:

- Bartels, Larry (2008). *Unequal Democracy*. Cap 9 (Economic Inequality and Political Representation). Pp. 252-282.
- Elkjaer, Mads Andresa and Iversen, Torben (2024). Democracy, class interest, and Redistribution, in: Lupu (Noam) and Pontusson, Jonas (2024). *Unequal Democracies: Public Policy, Responsiveness, and Redistribution in an Era of Rising Economic Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 54-97.
- Gilens, Martin (2012). *Affluence and influence: economic inequality and political power in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cap 3 (The Preference/Policy Link) e Cap 4. (Policy Domains and Democratic Responsiveness) Pp. 70-123
- Karabarounis, Loukas. 2011. “One Dollar, One Vote.” *Economic Journal*, 121:621-651.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Stasavage, David (2017). “Wealth Inequality and Democracy”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20:451-68.
- Mathisen, Ruben; Schakel, Wouter; Hence, Svenja; Elsässer, Lea; Persson, Mikael; Pontusson, Jonas (2014). Unequal Responsiveness and Government Partisanship in Northwest Europe, in: Lupu (Noam) and Pontusson, Jonas (2024). *Unequal Democracies: Public Policy, Responsiveness, and Redistribution in an Era of Rising Economic Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 29-53.

- **07 de outubro: AULA 8: O papel dos interesses organizados**

Leitura obrigatória:

- Hacker, Jacob S. and Pierson, Paul (2010). Winner-Take-all Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States. *Politics & Society*, 38 (2): 152-204.

Leituras complementares:

- Becher, Michael and Stegmüller, Daniel (2024). Organized interests and the Mechanisms behind unequal representation in legislatures, in: Lupu (Noam) and Pontusson, Jonas (2024). *Unequal Democracies: Public Policy, Responsiveness, and Redistribution in an Era of Rising Economic Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 133-76.
- Hacker, Jacob S. and Pierson, Paul. (2014). After the "Master Theory": Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis. *Reflections*, 12 (3): 643-62.
- Pierson, Paul (ed.) (2001). *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pierson, Paul (1994). *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pierson, Paul (ed.) (2001). Coping with Permanent Austerity: welfare state restructuring in affluent democracies, in: Pierson, P. *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- **14 de outubro: AULA 9: Crise e retração do welfare state**

Leitura obrigatória:

- Pierson, P. (2001). "Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies", in: Pierson, P. (ed.). *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Arretche, Marta and Souza, Pedro H. G. f. (2024). When incumbentes successfully retrench big and popular social policies: policy design matters, *Journal of Public Policy*, pp. 1-22.

Leituras complementares:

- Levy, J. D. (1999). "Vice into virtue? Progressive Politics and welfare reform in Continental Europe", *Politics & Society* 27(2): 239-73.
- Hacker, J. S. (2004). Privatizing risk without privatizing the welfare state: the hidden politics of social policy retrenchment in the United States, *The American Political Science Review*, 98(2): 243-60.
- Huber, E. & Stephens, J. (2001). *Development and crisis of the welfare state: parties and policies in global markets*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Myles, J. & Pierson, P. "Friedman's revenge: the reform of 'liberal' welfare states in Canada and United States", *Politics and Society*, 25: 443-472.
- Pierson, P. (1994). *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment* Cambridge University Press.
- Pierson, Paul (2001). "Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States", in in: PIERSON, P. (ed.). *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pierson, P. (1996). "The New Politics of the Welfare State", in: *World Politics*, 48(2):143-79.
- Swank, Duane (2001). "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: the impact of institutions on social policy change in developed democracies", in: Pierson, P. (ed.). *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- **21 de outubro: AULA 10: A Política da Queda da Desigualdade na América Latina**

Leituras obrigatórias:

- Fairfield, Tasha and Garay, Candelaria (2017). Redistribution under the Right in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Organized Actors in Policy Making. In: *Comparative Political Studies*. Volume 50 (14): 1871–1906.
- Feierherd, G.; Larroulet, P.; Long, W.; Lustig, N (2023). The Pink Tide and Income Inequality in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 65 (2): 110-44.

Leituras complementares:

- Birdsall, Nancy; Lustig, Nora; McLeod, Darryl (2011). Declining Inequality in Latin America: Some Economics, Some Politics. *Working Paper*, 1120, Tulane University.
- Lustig, Nora (2015). Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in Middle Income Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa. Center for Global Development. *Working Paper* 410.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. (2012). The politics of inequality and redistribution in Latin America's post-adjustment era, *WIDER Working Paper*, No. 2012/08.

**\*28 DE OUTUBRO NÃO HAVERÁ AULA\***

**• 04 de novembro: AULA 11: Desigualdade e Polarização Política**

Leituras obrigatórias:

- Barbosa, Pedro (2024). *Inequality or redistribution? The determinants of political polarization in Latin America (mimeo)*
- Samuels, D.; Mello, F.; Zucco, C. (2024). *Polarization and Perceptions of Status Gain and Loss: The Case of Brazil (mimeo)*

Leituras complementares:

- Grechyna, D. (2016). On the determinants of political polarization, *Economic Letters*, 114: 10-14.
- McCarthy, Poole, K. T.; Rosenthal, H. (2008). *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rueda, David (2005). Insider-outsider Politics in Industrialized Countries: the challenge to social democratic parties. *The American Political Science Review*, 99 (1): 61-74.

**• 11 de novembro: AULA 12: Síntese do curso e discussão dos trabalhos finais**