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Anaís Medeiros Passos

Democracies at War Against Drugs

The Military Mystique in Brazil and Mexico



Anaís Medeiros Passos Florianópolis, Brazil

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Praise for Democracies at War Against Drugs

"In an era when violence in Latin America remains widespread, we still lack a sufficient understanding of military crime fighting in the region. Anais M. Passos's well written and richly detailed study helps fill the gap. Drawing on exhaustive fieldwork including 100 interviews with military officers, politicians and civilians, this book is the first to compare military public security operations in the two high crime cities of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Tijuana, Mexico. It demonstrates how citizen perceptions regarding military superiority over police often drive governments to more frequently use soldiers in extensive crime-fighting operations, often at the expense of civilian control and police reform. This is an excellent study that deserves to be widely read and debated."

—David Pion-Berlin, Distinguished Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABRCC Associação Beneficiente Rio Criança Cidadã—Rio's Citizen

Youth Charitable Foundation

ACISO Ação Cívico Social—Civic Social Action ADA Amigo dos Amigos—Friends of Friends

AFO Arellano Félix Organization

AGN Archivo General de la Nación—National General Archive AMAN Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras—Agulhas Negras' Mili-

tary Academy

APERJ Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro—Public Archive

of the State of Rio de Janeiro

BOMs Basis de Operaciones Mixtas—Combined Operation Base BOPE Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais—Special Operations

Police Battalion

CANACINTRA Cámara Nacional de Industria de Transformación—National

Chamber of Manufacturing Industry

CANACO Cámara de Comercio Servicios e Turismos—Chamber of

Commerce, Services and Tourism

CCDH Comisión Ciudadana del Derechos Humanos del Noroeste—

Citizen Commission of Northwest Human Rights

CEDH Comisión Estatal de Derechos Humanos—State Human

Rights' Commission

CEV Comissão da Verdade do Rio—Rio's Truth Commission CISEN Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional—Directorate

for Investigation and National Security

CMDPDH Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de Derechos

Humanos—Mexican Commission of Defense and Promotion

of Human Rights

CNDH Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos—National

Commission of Human Rights

CNV Comissão Nacional da Verdade—National Truth Commission CODI Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna—Center for Internal

Defense Operations

CONAPO Consejo Nacional de Población—National Council of Popu-

lation

COPARMEX Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana—Employ-

ers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic

CV Comando Vermelho—Red Command DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DFS Dirección Federal de Seguridad—Federal Security Directorate DOI Destacamento de Operações de Informações—Department of

Information Operations

DOPS Departamento de Ordem Política e Social-Department of

Social and Political Order

DTO Drug Trafficking Organizations

ECEME Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército-Army

Command and General Staff School

ESAO Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficias—School fo Officers'

Instruction

EsEFEx Escola de Educação Física do Exército—Army School of

Physical Training

ESG Escola Superior de Guerra—Superior War College

FAFERJ Federação de Associações de Favelas do Estado do Rio de

Janeiro-Federation of Favelas of the State of Rio de Janeiro

FASP Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública—Public

Security Support Fund

GLO Operação de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem-Operation to

Ensure Law and Order

GPAES Grupamento de Polícia em Áreas Estratégicas—Police Group

for Special Areas

IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística—Brazilian Insti-

tute of Geography and Statistics

INEGI Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística—The National

Institute of Statistics and Geography

ISP Instituto de Segurança Pública—Public Security Institute

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MPF Ministério Público Federal—Public Prosecutor's Office

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OBAN Operation Bandeirantes—Bandeirantes Operation

PAC Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento—Acceleration

Growth Program

PAN Partido Acción Nacional—National Action Party

PCC Primeiro Comando da Capital—First Command of the

Capital

PDT Partido Democrático Trabalhista—Democratic Labor Party PFDC Procuradoria Federal dos Direitos do Cidadão—Federal

Attorney for Citizens' Rights

PFF Polícia Federal Preventiva—Federal Preventive Police

PGR Procuradoría General de la República—Attorney General of

the Republic

PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro-Party of the

Brazilian Democratic Movement

PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática—Party of the Demo-

cratic Revolution

PRI Partido Revolucionario Institutional—Institutional Revolu-

tionary Party

PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade—Socialism and Liberty Party

PT Partido dos Trabalhadores—Workers' Party

RCC Regimento de Carros de Combate—Regiment of Armed

Vehicles

SEDENA Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional—Secretariat of National

Defense

SEIDO Subprocuraduría Especializadas en Investigación de Delin-

cuencia Organizada—Anti-Organized Crime Unit from the

Mexican Federal Attorney's Office

SEMAR Secretaría de la Marina—Secretariat of the Navy

SESNSP Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad

Pública—National System of Public Security Executive Secre-

tariat

SNI Serviço Nacional de Informação—National Service of Infor-

mation

TCP Terceiro Comando Puro—Pure Third Command

UPP Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora—Unit of Pacifying Police

US United States of America

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